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the hazard of allowing battered child syndrome testimony to prejudice
the jury against a particular defendant. The court continues to require a
complete chain of evidence showing that a defendant had exclusive control over the abused child during several episodes of abuse including the
final injury. Thus, the court has controlled the use of a powerful form of
circumstantial evidence-expert testimony identifying "battered child
67
syndrome."

Torts-MINNESOTA'S "NEW TORT":
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS--Hubbard v. United Press International, Inc.,

OF

330

N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983).
The treatment of any element of damage as a parasitic factor belongs
essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A factor which is
today recognized as parasitic will, forsooth, tomorrow be recognized as
an independent basis of liability.'
These words have been prophetic, particularly in the area of the law
allowing recovery for emotional distress. 2 The movement toward recognition of the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 3 has been slow but relentless. 4 In light of this trend, the Minnesota
Supreme Court finally joined the majority of jurisdictions recognizing
5
the "new tort" of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
child abuse is not encouraged because of the higher level of proof demabded
under the rules of criminal law and procedure than in either the juvenile or
family courts. Second, the prosecutor must also cope with the requisite level of
intent demanded as an element of the alleged crime.
Burke, supra note 2, at 3 (legal system must protect child without unnecessary disruption
of family); Comment, supra note 31, at 258 (other forums desirable because criminal prosecution exacerbates existing family problems).
67. For further reading and an excellent bibliography on the battered child syndrome, see 2 AM. JUR. P.O.F.2D 87-90 (Supp. 1982).
1. Note, Torts-IntentionalInfiction of Mental Suffenng-A New Tort, 22 MINN. L. REV.
1030, 1031 (1938) (quoting I STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (9th ed.
1912)); see also Handford, IntentionalInfliction of Mental Distress. Analysis of the Growth of a
Tort, 8 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 1 (1979) ("[Tlhe tort of Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress now flourishes in the United States.").
2. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 12 (4th ed. 1971)
(background case progression indicating movement toward expansion of intentional inflic:
tion of emotional distress).
3. Hereinafter referred to as the "new tort."
4. Numerous jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement formulation of the tort. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977); see also Givelber, The Right to Minimum
Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Inficttion ofEmotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 43 n.9 (1982). See generally W. PROSSER,supra note
2, at 49-50 ("[T]he law is clearly in a process of growth, the ultimate limits of which
cannot as yet be determined.").
5. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983).
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In Hubbard v. United Press International, Inc.,6 the court unanimously
adopted the Restatement's formulation of the "new tort," 7 but denied the
plaintiff any recovery. 8 The court's message to prospective plaintiffs is
clear-recovery under the "new tort" will be an arduous task.
In the early development of the "new tort," 9 an individual's interest in
emotional tranquility l o received only incidental protection."l

Damages

6. Id The court considered several issues in addition to the "new tort." The plaintiff had also claimed discriminatory and retaliatory discharge under the Minnesota
Human Rights Act (MHRA), MINN. STAT. §§ 363.01-.14 (1982). The MHRA "appears
to be modeled after Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. "
Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 398 (Minn. 1978). The Minnesota Supreme Court has
applied principles developed in Title VII decisions for purposes of construing the MHRA.
Id at 399. For an informative discussion of the genesis of the MHRA, see Auerback, The
1967 Amendments To The Minnesota State Act Against DiscriminationAnd The Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Anti-DiscriminationAct:. A ComparativeAnalysis and Evaluation, 52 MINN. L.
REV. 231 (1967).
In Hubbard, the court adopted the McDonnell-Douglas three-part procedure of shifting

burdens of proof. See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). This
approach places the initial burden on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.at 802; see also Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the plaintiff is successful, a
presumption is created that the defendant has discriminated. Id at 254. The burden then
shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.
Id If a nondiscriminatory reason is articulated, the plaintiff has an opportunity to show
that it was merely a pretext or "cover" for discrimination. Id.at 255-56.
The Hubbard court held that even assuming that plaintiff had established a prima
facie case of discriminatog discharge, UPI met its burden of showing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Hubbard's discharge. 330 N.W.2d at 443. Although plaintiff had
established a prima facie case of retahltoy discharge, the court held that UPI had again
met its burden. Id at 444-45. Hubbard was unsuccessful in meeting his pretextual burden as to both these claims. Id.at 444, 446.
In reviewing the evidence of discrimination, the Minnesota Supreme Court apparently went far beyond the clearly erroneous standard of review applicable in Hubbard The
court's extensive examination of the evidence arguably borders on de novo review. See,
e.g., Dodge v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 278 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Minn. 1979). In the
federal context of judicial circumvention of established review standards, the United
States Supreme Court recently reprimanded a court of appeals for exceeding the clearly
erroneous boundary. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1981). Courts can no
longer justify an independent review of allegations of discrimination where the findings of
subsidiary fact are not clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Strecker v. Grand Forks County Social
Serv. Bd., 640 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1980).
7. 330 N.W.2d at 438-39; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 46(1).
8. 330 N.W.2d at 439.
9. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 12, at 49. The classic and perhaps most influential article on the historical development of the "new tort" is Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936). Cf Prosser, Insult and
Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40 (1956) (influential article on historical development of "new
tort") [hereinafter cited as Insult and Outrage/. For later cases and a modern view of this
area of the law, see Givelber, supra note 4 (arguing that all Restatement elements of tort can
be reduced to one-outrageousness).
10. Mental and emotional distress are generally treated as interchangeable terms.
11. Magruder, supra note 9, at 1055. Although a plaintiff's recovery depended upon
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for emotional distress were parasitically attached 12 to such independent
actions as assault,' 3 trespass,' 4 seduction,15 malicious prosecution,16
breach of promise to marry,17 and mistreatment of a corpse. 18 During
this embryonic period, Minnesota considered itself in the vanguard.19
Subsequent Minnesota Supreme Court decisions belied this initial perception, 20 as Minnesota relinquished its leadership role to other
21
jurisdictions.
an actionable tort, it was "legal recognition, to a limited extent, of the interest in mental
and emotional peace." Id.
12. The term "parasitic damages" was coined in 1906 by Professor Street in describing damages incidental to the underlying cause of action. See I STREET, FOUNDATIONS
OF LEGAL LIABILITY 461 (1906). "Under this theory, damages for emotional harm are
considered 'parasites' which cannot be recovered without being attached to some 'host.' "
Goins, IntentionalInjh'ction of EmotionalDistress-Escapingthe Impact Rule in Arkansas, 35 ARK.
L. REv. 533, 535 (1981).
13. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926) (although
defendant's conduct arguably fell short of actual assault, court awarded damages for
mental suffering); see also Interstate Life & Acc. Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599, 193 S.E.
458 (1937) (battery found where insurance adjuster deliberately tossed coin on bed of
woman hospitalized for heart condition); Allen v. Hannaford, 138 Wash. 423, 244 P. 700
(1926) (assault found where empty pistol was aimed at another and damages awarded for
resulting nervous condition).
14. Lesch v. Great N. Ry., 97 Minn. 503, 106 N.W. 955 (1906). The Lesch court
permitted damages to be attached to a legal wrong, regardless of whether impact occurred. In Lesch, defendant's conduct constituted a trespass to the wife's "interest" in the
homestead. This "interest" was fashioned because legal title was in her husband. Id. at
506, 106 N.W. at 957; see also Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel, 228 N.Y. 106, 126 N.E. 647
(1920) (damages awarded for emotional distress caused by hotel employees who forcibly
entered room of married couple and accused them of immoral conduct).
15. Haeissig v. Decker, 139 Minn. 422, 166 N.W. 1085 (1918).
16. Price v. Minnesota, D. & W. Ry., 130 Minn. 229, 153 N.W. 532 (1915).
17. See Kugling v. Williamson, 231 Minn. 135, 42 N.W.2d 534 (1950); Bukowski v.
Kuznia, 151 Minn. 249, 186 N.W. 311 (1922). In Bukowski, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the trial court's jury instruction that plaintiff could recover for "anguish of
mind, blighted affections or disappointed hopes" was proper. Id at 250, 186 N.W. at 312.
While the action was based upon a contract, the award of damages was based on an
underlying tort. See id
18. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891). In Larson, the Minnesota
Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to recover damages for "mental suffering and nervous
shock." Id. at 312, 50 N.W. at 240.
19. "Minnesota, in the well-reasoned case ofJohnson v. Sampson, [167 Minn. 203, 208
N.W. 814 (1926)] would allow a schoolgirl damages for mental suffering resulting from
false accusations of unchastity and threats of imprisonment, and has taken the lead in thi
field." Note, supra note 1, at 1038 (citations omitted); see also supra note 13 (discussing
Johnson).
20. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 122
N.W.2d 36 (1963) (recovery denied where neither accompanying physical injury nor direct invasion of plaintiff's legal rights existed).
21. The majority of jurisdictions now recognize the "new tort." See, e.g., Herman
Saks & Sons v. Ivey, 26 Ala. App. 240, 157 So. 265 (1934); Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355,
272 P.2d 349 (1954); Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W.2d 428 (1930); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952); Rugg v. McCarty,
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As Dean Prosser has noted, problems arise in applying the parasitic
approach to specific fact situations.22 In many instances, courts are unable to locate a tortious peg "upon which to hang the mental damages."2 3 While Minnesota retained the parasitic theory, 24 the majority of
jurisdictions dispensed with this approach.25 Despite persuasive policy
reasons for denying recovery absent an underlying tort, such as the threat
of fabricated damages and the burden upon the courts, 26 other jurisdic173 Colo. 170, 476 P.2d 753 (1970); Hiers v. Cohen, 31 Conn. Supp. 305, 329 A.2d 609
(1973); Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 70 D.C. App. 183, 105 F.2d 62 (1939);
Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950); Kuhr Bros. v. Spahos, 89 Ga. App. 885, 81
S.E.2d 491 (1954); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Burton, 104 Ind.App. 576, 12 N.E.2d 360 (1938);
Barnett v. Collection Serv., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932); Dawson v. Associated Fin.
Servs., 216 Kan. 814, 829 P.2d 104 (1974); Brown v. Crawford, 296 Ky. 249, 177 S.W.2d 1
(1943); Quina v. Robert's, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 1944); Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560,
380 A.2d 611 (1977); Spade v. Lynn & B.R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Campos v. Oldsmobile Div., 71 Mich. App. 23, 246 N.W.2d 352 (1976); Saenger Theatres
Corp. v. Herndon, 180 Miss. 791, 178 So. 86 (1938); Ackerman v. Thompson, 356 Mo.
558, 202 S.W.2d 795 (1947); LaSalle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W.
424 (1934); Mantz v. Follingstad, 84 N.M. 473, 505 P.2d 68 (1972); Halio v. Lurie, 15
A.D.2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1961); Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325
(1981); Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 189 Okla. 60, 113 P.2d 190 (1941); Pakos v.
Clark, 253 Ore. 113, 453 P.2d 682 (1969); Forster v. Manchester, 410 Pa. 192, 189 A.2d
147 (1963); Turner v. ABC Jalousie Co., 251 S.C. 92, 160 S.E.2d 528 (1968); First Nat'l
Bank v. Bragdon, 84 S.D. 89,167 N.W.2d 381 (1969); Medlin v. Allied Inv. Co., 217 Tenn.
469, 398 S.W.2d 270 (1966); Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 P. 429 (1916); Womack
v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974); Gadbury v. Bleitz, 133 Wash. 134, 233 P.
299 (1925); Monteleone v. Co-Op. Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 340, 36 S.E.2d 475 (1945);
Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963).
22. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 12, at 52 (parasitic rule would permit recovery for
gesture that might frighten plaintiff momentarily and deny recovery for menacing words
that terrorized him for lifetime).
23. For discussion of a case illustrating the extreme lengths courts have gone to create
an underlying tort, see Magruder, supra note 9, at 1066 (discussing Koerber v. Patek, 123
Wis. 453, 102 N.W. 40 (1905) (mutilation of corpse considered interference with interests
of survivors based on close relative's right of custody to corpse)).
24. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Village of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 122 N.W.2d
36 (1963).
25. See Givelber, supra note 4, at 43, 44 n.9; see also supra note 21 and accompanying
text (list of jurisdictions which have recognized "new tort").
26. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 12, at 50-51; see also Givelber,supra note 4, at 4445. Givelber states:
[Miajor objections to the recognition of the tort [are]: (1) the difficulty of differentiating between genuine emotional injuries and fictitious ones as well as between those that are serious enough to warrant legal redress and those that are
not, and (2) the inappropriateness of providing a judicial forum for every dispute that leaves someone feeling emotionally abused, particularly those that
arise out of everyday stress.
Id (citations omitted); see also State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330,
240 P.2d 282 (1952) (court permitted recovery under "new tort"); cf. Boyle v. Wenk, 378
Mass. 592, 392 N.E.2d 1053 (1979). In Boyle, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts stated:
We are mindful of the need for limits on recovery for intentional or reckless
infliction of emotional distress: 'No pressing social need requires that every abusive outburst be converted into a tort; upon the contrary it would be unfortunate
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tions recognized that a more effective "guarantee of genuineness" was to
adopt the Restatement elements and grant the tort an independent
27
existence.
Until Hubbard, courts applying Minnesota law continued to require an
underlying tort 28 or physical injury29 to provide a guarantee against
fabricated damages. 30 Notwithstanding the court's acceptance of the
"new tort," the historical reluctance toward recovery for emotional distress 3 1 pervades the Hubbard decision.3 2 The Hubbard court expressly
stated that its decision "does not signal an appreciable expansion in the
if the law closed all the safety valves through which irascible tempers might legally blow off steam. . . .' Moreover, the courts must be particularly wary in
this area to avoid fictitious claims.
However, where a person engages in intentional conduct which is designed
to and actually does, result in severe emotional and physical damage, the possibility of trivial or fictitious claims does not justify denial of recovery to the
victim.
Id at 596-97, 392 N.E.2d at 1056 (citations omitted).
27. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 12, at 52. A number of commentators have encouraged recognition of the "new tort" as a guarantee against fabricated damages. See
Borda, Ones Right to Enjoy Mental Peace and Tranquility, 28 GEO. L.J. 55 (1939); Prosser,
Intentional Inf'ction Of Mental Suffering. A New Tort, 37 MIcH. L. REV. 874 (1939); Seitz,
Insults-PracticalJokes-Threats Of Future Hann-How New As Torts?, 28 Ky. L.J. 411
(1940); Void, Tort Recovery For Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress, 18 NEB. L. BULL.
222 (1939); Wade, Tort Liability For Abusive And Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REV. 63
(1950); see also Note, An Independent Tort Action For Mental Suffering And Emotional Distress, 7
DRAKE L. REV. 53 (1957) (importance of the tort in Iowa case law).
28. See, e.g., Schus v. Prudential Ins. Co., 96 F. Supp. 400 (D. Minn. 1950) (no recovery where, to avoid payment of benefits, employer terminated employee before physical
condition could deteriorate into permanent disability); Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn.
203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926) (recovery permitted where false charge of unchastity made
against schoolgirl); Beaulieu v. Great N. Ry., 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (1907) (no
recovery for mental anguish damages under breach of contract action absent willful or
malicious conduct by defendant); Lesch v. Great N. Ry., 97 Minn. 503, 106 N.W. 955
(1906) (recovery permitted where defendant's conduct frightened plaintiff); Purcell v. St.
Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892) (recovery permitted where defendant's
negligence placed plaintiff in apparent danger, which was proximate cause of plaintiff's
mental distress); Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891) (recovery permitted
where wife was not allowed to dispose of husband's corpse).
29. See, e.g., Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969)
(recovery permitted where plaintiff suffered persistent physical disability); State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Village of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 122 N.W.2d 36 (1963) (recovery
denied where no physical injury shown); Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50
N.W. 1034 (1892) (recovery permitted where fright caused nervous convulsions culminating in miscarriage).
30. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
31. See Langeland v. Farmers State Bank, 319 N.W.2d 26 (Minn. 1982); Bjordahl v.
Bjordahl, 308 N.W.2d 817 (Minn. 1981); Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980);
Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas., 277 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1977); Wild
v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 234 N.W.2d 775 (1975), cert. dismissed, 424 U.S. 902 (1976); Independent Grocery Co. v. Sun Ins. Co., 146 Minn. 214, 178 N.W. 582 (1920); Beaulieu v.
Great N. Ry., 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (1907); Sanderson v. Northern Pac. Ry., 88
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scope of conduct actionable under this theory of recovery."33
The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress under the
Restatement's formulation of the "new tort" are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intentional or reckless conduct; (3) causation; and (4)
severe emotional distress.3 4 Although difficulties of proof arise with each
element,35 two are persistently troublesome for plaintiffs-the definition
37
36
and proof of severe emotional distress.
of outrageous conduct

Comments to the Restatement describe outrageous conduct as that
which goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and is regarded as
atrocious or utterly intolerable in a civilized community.38 Such conduct
would lead an average member of the community to resent the actor and
exclaim, "outrageous! "39
The definition of severe emotional distress is equally unclear.40 Liability arises only when the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable
person could be expected to endure it.41 Consequently, the severity of
the distress is measured by the extent of the outrageous conduct. Although the Restatement emphasizes that bodily harm is not a prerequisite
Minn. 162, 92 N.W. 542 (1902); Buckman v. Great N. Ry., 76 Minn. 373, 79 N.W. 98
(1899).
32. See, e.g., 330 N.W.2d at 438-39.
33. Id. at 439.
34. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 46(1).
35. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 12, at 50.
36. See Givelber, supra note 4, at 43-52. "The term outrageous is neither value-free
nor exacting. It does not objectively describe an act or series of acts; rather, it represents
an evaluation of behavior. The concept thus fails to provide clear guidance to those who
must evaluate that conduct." Id. at 51.
37. See Insult and Outrage, supra note 9, at 43. Prosser states that:
[Emotional distress] must of course be proved; and since it is easily feigned and
difficult to deny, the courts have tended quite naturally to insist upon some
guarantee of genuineness, either in the form of physical consequences which can
be attested objectively, or in the nature of the defendant's conduct and the circumstances of the case.
Id (citations omitted).
An alternative to direct proof of a nebulous psychic injury, is to shift the emphasis to
the more visible element, outrageous conduct. "Greater proof that mental suffering occurred is found in the defendant's conduct designed to bring it about than in physical
injury that may or may not have resulted therefrom." State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v.
Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (1952).
38. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 46 comment d; see also id comments e-g, j-k.
See genera4ly Givelber, supra note 4, at 46-47.
39. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 46 comment d; see Magruder, supra note 9, at
1058. Magruder argues that the outrageous element is "as practicable to apply as the
standard of reasonable care in ordinary negligence cases .... ." Id
40. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 46 comment j. "[Severe emotional distress]
includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea." Id
41. Id The severity of distress ensures against fictitiousness. Where there is a particularly susceptible victim, the Restatement appears to require that the defendant have knowledge of that condition and proceed in the face of it. See id.comment f.
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to recovery, 4 2 physical injury remains the best evidence of severe emotional distress.43 The defendant's conduct must be considerably more
outrageous when emotional distress alone is alleged than would be re4
quired for recovery if physical injury were also alleged. 4
Thus, the vaguely defined standard of outrageousness is used to establish the other-severe emotional distress. In Hubbard, the plaintiff failed
to meet the burden of proof for these two elements of the cause of
45
action.
In 1969, James Hubbard became a full-time employee for United
46
Press International (UPI) under a collective bargaining agreement.
From 1974 to 1980, Hubbard served as the news-picture bureau manager
for Minnesota. 47 During his first six years with UPI, Hubbard received
recognition from others in his field for his fine work as a photojournalist. 48 Early in 1976, Hubbard disclosed to his superiors that he was completing treatment for alcoholism.4 9 From that point on, Hubbard
0
contended, UPI harassed him because of his alcoholism.5
After Hubbard disclosed his treatment, he was pulled from an assignment to cover the Montreal Olympics.51 Hubbard's supervisor, Ray
Macchini, 52 wrote to Hubbard, explaining that he had to "prove himself" to retain his job.53 As the court noted, "This letter was the first
42. Id comment k.
43. See, e.g., 330 N.W.2d at 438. The court stated that Hubbard's inability to prove
some physical manifestation of his distress was fatal with regard to establishing this element of his cause of action. Id at 440. Contra State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff,
38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (1952) ("In cases where mental suffering constitutes
a major element of damages it is anomalous to deny recovery because the defendant's
intentional misconduct fell short of producing some physical injury.").
44. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 46 comment j; see also W. PROSSER, supra note
2, at 60. Prosser states:
In 1948 a section of the Restatement of Torts was amended to reject any absolute necessity for physical results. Probably the conclusion to be reached is that
where physical harm is lacking the court will properly tend to look for more in the way of
extreme outrage as an assurance that the mental disturbance claimed is not flctitious but
that if the enormity of the outrage itself carries conviction that there has in fact
been severe and serious mental distress, which is neither feigned nor trivial, bodily harm is not required.
Id (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
45. See 330 N.W.2d at 440.
46. Id at 431.
47. See id.
48. Id.; see also Respondent's Brief and Appendix at 8 (Hubbard named Nebraska
newspaper photographer of the year for three consecutive years and received spot news
award from National Press Photographers Association).
49. 330 N.W.2d at 432.
50. Id at 431.
51. Id at 432.
52. Ray Macchini, manager of UPI's central division, was Hubbard's immediate supervisor. Macchini reported directly to Bill Lyon, a vice president of UPI in New York.
Id at 431.
53. Id at 432. UPI contended that Hubbard "lacked news judgment and aggressive-
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indication that Hubbard received from Macchini that his overall performance had been less than satisfactory and that his job was consequently threatened. ' ' 54 In October 1976, Hubbard was assigned to cover
President Ford's campaign visit to Iowa.55 Macchini became upset because Hubbard arrived in Des Moines the same morning as the President. 56 These events led Hubbard to believe there was a "campaign
against him."57
In April 1977, Hubbard was suspended for three days without pay and
given a final warning about his job performance. 58 Six months later,
Macchini's supervisor, Bill Lyon, felt that "UPI had just and sufficient
cause to dismiss." 59 Rather than fire Hubbard, UPI preferred to negotiate a resignation. 60 The parties met, 6 1 and as Hubbard later testified,
Macchini stated at the meeting that UPI would "get him," even if it took
62
five years.
Hubbard refused to resign, continuing to work for UPI without incident until 1979. In June of that year, Hubbard was asked to volunteer to
cover the Nicaraguan civil war, and initially agreed to do so. 63 Hubbard
changed his mind 64 after he learned of the dangers involved and the illegal bargaining necessary to move into and across Nicaragua.65 Hubbard
later testified that he felt he was being "set up" by UPI.66 Determined to
get Hubbard's resignation, Lyon wrote to another UPI official, stating
ness, and failed to properly service clients or keep in touch with the Minneapolis bureau."
Id at 432-33; see Appellant's Brief at 19.
54. 330 N.W.2d at 432.
.55. Id at 433.
56. Id
57. Id After this incident Hubbard contacted his union. Id In his letter, Hubbard
stated that "the negative file is building ... since treatment for chemical dependency."
Respondent's Brief and Appendix at 20.
58. 330 N.W.2d at 433. Hubbard was suspended because he had committed what
UPI considered a cardinal sin-he could not be reached. Hubbard countered that he had
called three times that weekend. Id. After this incident, Hubbard filed a grievance with
his union. Id.
59. Id
60. Id.
61. This meeting took place in a bar, at Macchini's request. Respondent's Brief and
Appendix at 51. In the opinion of a specialist in chemical dependency counseling, taking
a chemically dependent employee to a bar and threatening his job was "debilitating and
abusive"-like "kicking the crutches out from under a crippled person." Id
62. 330 N.W.2d at 434.
63. Id
64. Id Hubbard "felt that UPI was being careless with his life" in sending him on a
suicide mission. Respondent's Brief and Appendix at 21.
65. 330 N.W.2d at 434. Hubbard made the decision after talking to several correspondents, whereupon the assignment appeared more dangerous than he had expected.
See id; Respondent's Brief and Appendix at 20-21. Hubbard felt that bribing people in
Nicaragua with money and liquor was unprofessional and unnecessarily hazardous. 330
N.W.2d at 434; see Respondent's Brief and Appendix at 21.
66. 330 N.W.2d at 434.
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that they were going to have to get rid of Hubbard.67 Lyon suggested
that a file be built to support Hubbard's dismissal, since UPI did not
have a strong case against him. 6a
The final conflict between Hubbard and UPI arose five months later,
when Hubbard went to Thailand as a volunteer for the American Refugee Committee. 69 UPI mistakenly assumed that Hubbard took company
time and used UPI credentials to take his trip.70 When UPI learned that
Hubbard sent pictures from Thailand over UPI wires, Macchini ordered
a "mandatory kill" on the photographs. 7' At trial, Hubbard alleged that
when he learned of the "mandatory kill," he was shocked, extremely embarrassed, and his physical health was affected.72 On June 28, 1980, UPI
73
terminated Hubbard's employment.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that Hubbard did not meet his
burden of proof for the two crucial elements of intentional infliction of
emotional distress-the outrageousness of UPI's conduct and severe emotional distress. 74 In reversing the jury's determination,75 the court focused on the Restatement's "high threshold standard of proof required of a
76
complainant before his case may be submitted to a jury."
The court found that UPI's actions were neither extreme nor outrageous. 7 7 With regard to UPI's allegation that Hubbard had "chickened
out" of an assignment, 78 the court stated that the defendant's conduct
was unpleasant, but not outrageous. 79 Even when UPI's course of conduct was viewed on the whole, the court found, it did not rise to the level
67. Id at 435.
68. Id
69. Id The American Refugee Committee had sent medical personnel to Thailand
and Hubbard accompanied them to photograph their efforts. Id
70. See id at 436.
71. A "mandatory kill" instructs the client not to use the photograph. It is rarely
issued and usually sent only when a photo has the wrong caption or improper identification. Id; see also Respondent's Brief and Appendix at 33 ("mandatory kill" is used in
industry only when there is reason to believe that news photo is fictitious or phony).
72. See 330 N.W.2d at 436. Hubbard complained of vomiting, stomach problems,
skin rash, and high blood pressure. Id at 440.
73. Id at 437.
74. See id. at 439. The court stated:
Examining the entire record, we find it doubtful that Hubbard met his burden
of production with regard to any of the elements of his cause of action. We need
not pass upon each element" however, for we find the lack of evidence of extreme
and outrageous conduct and of the actual occurrence of severe emotional distress
to be dispositive.
Id
75. Id
76. Id
77. Id.
78. Macchini accused Hubbard of "chickening out" of the Nicaragua assignment. Id
at 435; see supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing Nicaraguan assignment).
79. 330 N.W.2d at 439.
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of outrage needed to impose liability.8 0
Hubbard was a recovering alcoholic, making him particularly vulnerable to harassment.8 ' The Restatement indicates that a plaintiff's peculiar
vulnerability, particularly when a defendant has knowledge of the vulnerability, may mitigate the level of outrageousness required to impose

liability.8 2 UPI knew of Hubbard's condition, yet proceeded against him
in spite of it.83
The court took the position that UPI had done no more than insist
upon its legal rights in a permissible way,8 4 even though such insistence

was certain to cause emotional distress.8 5 The court described UPI's conduct as "employment discipline" and "criticism of Hubbard's job performance. ' 86 The question of when an employer's conduct exceeds

permissible bounds can only be answered ad hoc, especially in the case of

87
an employee's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Even minor altercations with an employer can be traumatic for a vulnerable employee.88 Weighing the evidence to determine whether the employer's conduct was outrageous is a task best left to the jury.

80. Id at 439-40. The court apparently believed that the proper level of outrage
necessary to constitute outrageous conduct was reached in a Massachusetts decision, Boyle
v. Wenk, 378 Mass. 592, 392 N.E.2d 1053 (1979). See 330 N.W.2d at 439-40. The court's
reliance upon Boyle as a barometer of the proper level of outrage appears misplaced. In
Boyle, a woman was repeatedly harassed over the telephone by a private investigator making inquiries of the woman's brother-in-law. 378 Mass. at 593-94, 392 N.E.2d at 1054-55.
The investigator knew that the woman had just been released from the hospital, yet he
persisted in contacting her. Id at 594, 392 N.E.2d at 1055. The Boyle court had little
difficulty in holding that the investigator's conduct was outrageous because the woman's
emotional distress was physically manifested when she began to hemorrhage and required
medical assistance. See id. Since physical manifestation of emotional distress is not a prerequisite to recovery under the "new tort," the Hubbard court's reliance on Boyle as a guide
to determine an appropriate level of outrage was misplaced.
81. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing Hubbard's alcoholism).
82. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 46 comment f.
83. 330 N.W.2d at 432.
84. The Hubbard court stated that the injury did not "exceed that of any employee
who experiences an employer's criticism or reproof concerning job performance." Id. at
440; see RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 46 comment g.
85. In most situations in which intentional infliction of emotional distress is claimed,
such as failure to pay a valid insurance claim, collection practices, or wrongful discharge,
some distress is intended, in order to force the other party to acquiesce in some way. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 46 comment i.
86. 330 N.W.2d at 439.
87. Assessing the legality of employer actions is a case-by-case process. See, e.g., Pine
River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) (policy provisions in employee
handbook adopted after employee was hired binding on employer); Grouse v. Group
Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981) (damages awarded on promissory estoppel where employee had not yet begun new job, but had resigned prior position and
turned down another offer); Bautch v. Red Owl Stores, 278 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1979)
(damages awarded to employee discharged for committing expressly forbidden act where
employer had previously condoned practice).
88. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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Hubbard also failed to demonstrate severe emotional distress. The
court emphasized that the record did not contain medical evidence regarding Hubbard's condition.89 Rather, the primary evidence of injury
was Hubbard's own testimony.9 0 In the court's words, Hubbard suffered
no more than "any employee who experiences an employer's criticism
.. ."91

In addressing this second dispositive element, severe emotional distress,
the court stressed the "conspicuous" absence of medical evidence in the
record. 92 The court commented that Hubbard "never missed work,
never filed a claim for workers' compensation and never saw a doctor
.

.

.

. '93

Apparently the court was searching for that which it had de-

94
cided was no longer necessary-physical manifestation of the distress.
In fact, the court quoted a 1926 Minnesota case, stating that verdicts
"based chiefly on proof of subjective symptoms, will not usually be allowed to stand." 95
Proof of severe emotional distress does not require bodily harm under
the rubric of the Restatement.96 While distress must be demonstrated, the
outrageousness of the defendant's conduct can provide important evidence that the distress occurred. 9 7 Absent physical injury, the character
of the defendant's conduct becomes a reliable indicator of genuineness. 98
The Hubbard court artfully avoided scrutiny of UPI's conduct having res-

89. 330 N.W.2d at 440. The medical profession has recognized that emotions have
both subjective aspects and objective characteristics. See Smith, Relation Of Emotions To
Injuy And Disease: Legal Liabilityfor Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193, 213 (1944). Smith
defines the subjective aspects as "feelings personal to the subject affected [which] the examiner must rely primarily upon the patient's history to obtain information and description of what he has experienced." Id at 213 n.54. The clinical information presented in
Smith's article is based on an article written for the medical profession which was coauthored by Smith and Dr. Stanley Cobb, Professor of Neuropathology, Harvard Medical
School and Psychiatrist in Chief, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston. See Smith &
Cobb, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease." A Callfor Forensic Psychosomatic Mediine, 19
ANN. INTERNAL MED. 873 (1943). Smith defines the objective aspects as "outward manifestations of a morbid condition which a competent examiner can discover by inspection
and observation without aid from the patient." Smith, supra, at 213 n.54.
90. See 330 N.W.2d at 440.
91. Id
92. Id.; see supra notes 43, 72, 89-91 and accompanying text.
93. 330 N.W.2d at 440.
94. See id.at 438.
95. Id. at 440 n.9 (quoting Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814
(1926)).
96. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 46 comment k. The Restatement requires bodily
harm only where the outrageous conduct is directed at a third party. Id at § 46(2) comment b.
97. See id.§ 46 comment d, illustrations 1-4.
98. See Hume v. Bayer, 178 N.J. Super. 310, 319, 428 A.2d 966, 970 (1981) ("[T]he
intentional nature of the actor's conduct gives the injured party's claim an added element
of reliability.').
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urrected the requirement of physical injury under the guise of proof of
emotional distress.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred in
submitting the case to the jury.99 In finding that Hubbard did not produce sufficient evidence to merit jury consideration of his claim, the
Supreme Court relied on a Restatement comment. The comment provides, "It is for the court to determine whether on the evidence severe
emotional distress and outrageous conduct can be found; it is for the jury
to determine whether on the evidence, it has in fact existed."l0o Ironically, the Hubbard court chose not to seek the further guidance of the
Restatement with respect to the role of the court and jury. Another comment to the Restatement provides:
It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may be reasonably regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where
reasonable men may differ, it is for the juy, subject to the control of the
court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has
been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability. 10 1
With the jury's determination available to the Hubbard court, hindsight
demonstrated that indeed reasonable persons differed on the issues of
outrageous conduct and severe distress. Therefore, on a complete reading of the Restatement's formulation, the trial court may not have erred in
submitting the case to the jury.
Minnesota's past recalcitrance in this area may provide a partial explanation for the Hubbard court's unwillingness to permit the jury to participate in the recognition of the "new tort." Consideration of the strong
policies against the "new tort," as well as the "new tort's" particular vulnerability to fictitious and speculative claims102 provides insight into the
court's cautious approach to any definition of the cause of action. Prudence, however, should not preclude justifiable recoveries, nor prevent a
99. See 330 N.W.2d at 436.
100. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 46 comment j; see 330 N.W.2d at 440.
101. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 46 comment h (emphasis added). For courts adhering to the guidance of comment h, see State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38
Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952); Boyle v. Wenk, 378 Mass. 592, 392 N.E.2d 1053 (1979);
Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1947). The Sihznoff'court stated:
The jury is ordinarily in a better position . . . to determine whether outrageous
conduct results in mental distress than whether that distress in turn results in
physical injury. From their own experience jurors are aware of the extent and
character of the disagreeable emotions that may result from the defendant's conduct, but a difficult medical question is presented when it must be determined if
emotional distress resulted in physical injury . . . . Greater proof that mental
suffering occurred is found in the defendant's conduct designed to bring it about
than in physical injury that may or may not have resulted therefrom.
38 Cal. 2d at 338, 240 P.2d at 286 (citations omitted).
102. See State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282
(1952); Boyle v. Wenk, 378 Mass. 592, 392 N.E.2d 1053 (1979); Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah
2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961); Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974).
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jury's participation in the process. "The jury is ordinarily in a better
position. . . to determine whether outrageous conduct results in mental
distress . .

.

. From their own experience jurors are aware of the extent

and character of the disagreeable emotions that may result from the de03
fendant's conduct."'
The Hubbard court discarded the jury's determination of UPI's outrageous conduct and Hubbard's severe distress.104 The Restatement's standard, the exclamation "outrageous!" by an average member of the
community,105 supports substantial deference to ajury's findings. Jurors
are average members of the community, presumed to have knowledge of
that which is deemed intolerable conduct in a civilized society.106
The Minnesota Supreme Court has belatedly joined the ranks of the
majority in recognizing the independent tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Regretably, the court's application of the "new tort"
fails to provide clear guidance. Yet, despite its rather inhospitable debut,
Minnesota's "new tort" offers protection against emotional distress in an
increasingly pressure-packed society. Although not every injured feeling
can be compensated, the societal requirement of a "toughened mental
hide" is no longer a barrier to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Torts-RECOGNITION OF NEGLIGENT HIRING EXPANDS EMPLOYER LIA-

BILITY-Pontcas v. KM.S Investments, 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983).
At common law, the tort liability of an employer to his employee was
limited to certain minimum obligations.' The fellow servant rule imposed liability when an employer's own negligence injured his employee,
but precluded employer liability when a fellow servant's negligence in103. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286
(1952). But see Theis, The Intenttinal In'ction Of Emotional Distress." A Need For Limits on
Liability, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 275, 289 (1977) (severity of distress found dependent on
background of each juror).
104. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
105. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 46 comment d.
106. But see Appellant's Brief at 136. "Tort liability cannot be pegged to notions of
decency or morality which are subject to the same sort of vicissitudes as hemlines or hair
length." Id.
1. The common law duties of the master for the protection of his servants were as
follows: 1)to provide a safe workplace; 2) to provide safe tools and equipment; 3) to give
warnings of dangers probably unknown to the servant; 4) to provide sufficient numbers of
suitable fellow servants; and 5) to issue and enforce rules for the conduct of employees to
make the workplace safe. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 60 (4th ed.
1971). The injured worker's recovery was further limited in cases of employer negligence
by the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule.
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